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To compensate for the lack of laboratories in remote
areas, the national reference laboratory for meningitis in
Niger used polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to enhance
the surveillance of meningitis caused by Neisseria menin-
gitidis, Streptococcus pneumoniae, and  Haemophilus
influenzae. PCR effectively documented the wide geo-
graphic spread of N. meningitidis serogroup W135.
N
iger is a sub-Saharan country located in the center of
the African “meningitis belt,” which includes all or
parts of 18 sub-Saharan countries (1). The population of
approximately 11 million is mainly concentrated in the
southern part of the territory; 84% of the population lives
in rural areas. Every year, during the dry, warm, and windy
season, between January and May, localized epidemics of
meningococcal meningitis occur in several districts,
whereas major epidemics, affecting the entire territory,
break out at regular intervals of every few years (2,3).
Previously, all important epidemics have been caused by
Neisseria meningitidis serogroup A, and occasionally,
small outbreaks have been caused by serogroup X isolates
(4). However, sporadic cases of meningitis caused by
serogroup  N. meningitidis W135 have been laboratory-
confirmed in Niger since the beginning of the 1980s (5).
Strains of serogroup W135 were found as often as strains
of serogroup A at the end of the epidemic of 2001 (6). In
2002 and again in 2003, Burkina Faso experienced the first
large epidemics caused by N. meningitidis serogroup
W135 in Africa (7,8). This event is a cause of concern for
public health authorities of neighboring countries, includ-
ing Niger, and for the World Health Organization because
current affordable meningococcal vaccines available in
large amounts target only N. meningitidis serogroups Aand
C and do not protect against serogroup W135. On the other
hand, vaccines including the N. meningitidis serogroup
W135 valency are not only expensive but also rare, and
this situation will likely continue for the next 3 to 4 years.
Enhanced microbiologic surveillance is needed to quickly
identify the serogroup of N. meningitidis involved so that
the appropriate vaccine for emergency mass vaccination
can be selected (9).
In Niger, few laboratories are able to perform etiologic
diagnosis of bacterial meningitis, although the country is
large (1,267,000 km2) and the population is scattered. Until
2002, microbiologic surveillance existed but was inade-
quate because it focused almost entirely on the capital city.
The Centre de Recherches Médicales et Sanitaires (CER-
MES) in Niamey became, in 2002, a national biomedical
research center under the authority of the Ministry of
Health (MOH) and the national reference center for menin-
gitis in Niger. The polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
method for the diagnosis of acute bacterial meningitis was
transferred from the Institut Pasteur (Paris, France) for
research purposes in October 2002. Therefore, CERMES
decided to include the PCR assay in the national frame-
work of the routine surveillance system of the MOH in
November 2002 to be ready when the next meningitis sea-
son began in January. The MOH has asked physicians and
nurses to systematically keep frozen (or at least refrigerat-
ed in small health facilities) every sample of cerebrospinal
fluid (CSF) collected from patients with suspected cases of
acute meningitis. Most often, in remote healthcare centers
and in the absence of laboratories, the clarity of the CSF
was assessed by macroscopic examination only, so the
entire volume of CSF that was previously discarded was
kept for PCR analysis. In the few district hospitals that
have appropriate laboratory facilities, the remaining CSF
samples were stored after the latex agglutination assay or
bacteriologic tests had been performed. After laboratory
personnel had been informed of the purpose of the surveil-
lance, sterile tubes and epidemiologic forms were set up in
14 health districts within a radius of approximately 250 km
of Niamey. The designated area represented approximate-
ly 35% of the whole population. Afterwards, the CSF sam-
ples were regularly collected by a CERMES vehicle,
according to a precise timetable. Later, tubes and forms
were also set up in all health regions of Niger, and the
healthcare centers located beyond the limit of 250 km used
any suitable opportunities to convey the CSF samples to
CERMES. Thus, the microbiologic surveillance included
>50% of the population. The implementation of this strat-
egy and the use of the results were carried out in close col-
laboration with the national surveillance system.
CSF specimens were tested by PCR (amplification for
35 cycles) for the three main causative agents of acute bac-
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Streptococcus pneumoniae (11), and Haemophilus influen-
zae (12). Asecond PCR was performed on specimens pos-
itive for N. meningitidis to identify serogroups A, B, C, and
Y/W135, and finally, serogroups Y/W135 were differenti-
ated from both Y and W135 alone by a confirmative PCR
(10). In the same manner, specimens positive for H.
influenzae were further tested for type b DNA.
From November 2002 to May 2003, which included the
entire season of transmission, 1,651 CSF specimens col-
lected within the national surveillance system were
processed by using PCR; 1,239 (75%) specimens came
from outside the capital, Niamey. Until mid-2002, most of
these specimens would have been lost for microbiologic
surveillance. A total of 778 specimens (47.1%) were posi-
tive: 661 for N. meningitidis (85%), 83 for S. pneumoniae
(10.1%), and 34 for H. influenzae (4.4%). The results of
CSF examinations, according to the month and region, are
presented in Figures 1 and 2. Surveillance highlighted that
the meningococcal serogroup N. meningitidis W135
accounted for 8.5% of all N. meningitidis and that W135
was found in most of the regions in Niger, although it did
not cause epidemics. N. meningitidis serogroup W135 was
rare or absent in regions where N. meningitidis serogroup
A epidemics occurred (three serogroup W135 isolates
among 368 N. meningitidis isolates in Zinder and no W135
among 79 N. meningitidis isolates in Maradi). With 284
specimens from Niamey, which had undergone both PCR
and bacteriologic testing, we compared the results from the
two methods. The results of both tests were in agreement
for 231 specimens (81.3%); results for 182 of those speci-
mens were negative. PCR found 25 positive samples for
which bacteriologic tests were negative, and 8 more posi-
tive specimens on which bacteriologic testing could not be
carried out because of contamination. Conversely, bacteri-
ologic testing provided a diagnosis for six PCR-negative
samples. However, the region of Niamey presented the
lowest overall rate of confirmation of suspected bacterial
meningitis so this comparison is less conclusive. The two
diagnostic methods were also applied to 102 specimens
sent on trans-isolate medium. As is frequently observed, a
contamination problem occurred, and 32 samples (31.3%)
were unsuitable for bacteriologic testing, but PCR identi-
fied a causative agent in 20 of these 32 cases. Of the
remaining samples, for 46 (65.7%), bacteriologic testing
and PCR results were concordant, whereas 19 samples
negative by bacteriologic testing, tested positive by PCR.
The opposite was observed for two specimens.
The overall proportion of specimens that tested positive
for one of the three species of bacteria varied according to
the period. From November to February, before the menin-
gitis epidemic season, the positivity rate was low in all the
regions. In March and April, during the epidemic season,
the positivity rate remained low in the districts not under-
going epidemics, although the positivity rate reached
60.9% in the Zinder region, where epidemics due to N.
meningitidis serogroup A occurred. Because of the uncer-
tainty of the cold chain in remote areas, some specimens
may have been stored without taking into account the tem-
perature conditions, which might have affected the sensi-
tivity of the PCR testing. An analysis of confirmation rates
must also take into account that CSF samples were tested
whether they were cloudy or purulent or not and that the
currently used PCR focuses on three species only, although
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Figure 1. Results of polymerase chain reaction assay on cere-
brospinal fluid specimens, November 2002–May 2003. S,
Streptococcus; H, Haemophilus; N, Neisseria.
Figure 2. Distribution of serogroups of Neisseria meningitidis
according to region, November 2002–May 2003. (N. meningitidis
U.S. = unpredicted serogroup, i.e., not A, not B, not C, not Y and
not W135.)DISPATCHES
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many other causes of meningitis exist. The proportion of
negative results may also indicate that the national health
services keep a vigilant watch over meningitis and that the
diagnosis is widely used, perhaps excessively. The symp-
toms are not fully specific, and the predictive value of the
clinical picture for meningococcal meningitis increases
substantially during an epidemic, as shown by the results
from Zinder.
In contrast to the culture method, which requires that
laboratories receive live bacteria (quite restricting, given
the fragility of N. meningitidis), PCR offers the substantial
benefit of being able to be performed on dead bacterial
cells that have been killed by either refrigeration or previ-
ous antimicrobial drug treatment. The simple way of stor-
ing and dispatching CSF samples collected in remote areas
was convenient and realistic for the circumstances in
Niger. Although the biologic confirmation by PCR is retro-
spective in our study and cannot be used for case manage-
ment, this surveillance network compensates efficiently
for the lack of functional laboratories at the local level out-
side of the capital. During the 2003 meningitis season,
PCR assay allowed satisfactory monitoring of the
causative agents of bacterial meningitis and of the
involved meningococcal serogroups, which is important in
adapting the most appropriate preventive strategy while
serogroup W135 has the potential to cause epidemics in
the countries of the meningitis belt.
In conclusion, to compensate for the severe shortage of
laboratories outside the capital, the PCR assay proved to
be a valuable tool for routine microbiologic surveillance of
bacterial meningitis in Niger. The country has started
implementing the Integrated Disease Surveillance and
Response plan within which this microbiologic surveil-
lance is fully integrated.
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